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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes a particular type of notes observed in
securitization transactions: combination notes. Combination notes are formed
by combining parts of two or more tranches of securitization transactions,
where one part usually consists of a share of the first loss piece. It is analyzed
whether combination notes are purely demand driven, or whether combination
notes also appear to be structured to enable equity transfer. Results indicate
that combination notes serve both purposes: market segmentation severely
determines the structuring of combination notes, but risk transfer needs seem
to be catered by combination notes as well. Further, an analysis of launch
spreads indicates, that the observed equity transfer via combination notes has
an impact on the pricing of the ordinary tranches of each deal. This paper
makes use of unique data on 126 deals containing 1385 tranches, thereof 398
combination notes.
1 Introduction
Securitization of assets can be characterized by two prevailing structural elements.
Several assets are assembled (pooling) to collateralize securities that are sold to fi-
nancial markets in different tranches (tranching), with the principle of subordination
usually being applied. The resulting notes are called asset backed securities (ABS).
Securitization grew tremendously in the last decade, with different types of assets
being securitized. The main categories are the securitization of mortgages (RMBS,
CMBS), the securitization of consumer assets, and the securitization of debt claims
(CDOs).1 This paper focuses on one special note issued in securitization transac-
tions: combination notes (also called combo notes). A combination note (CN) is
∗Full address and affiliation: Institute of Capital Market Research and Finance, Munich School
of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Schackstr. 4, 80539 Munich, Germany. Com-
ments should be addressed to schaber@bwl.lmu.de, or +49/89/21802145. I thank Dr. Marco
Krohn, HypoVereinsbank/UniCredit Global Research, for providing the data used in this study
and for numerous helpful comments.
1The securitization of consumer asset is sometimes referred to as ABS, such as the securitization of
assets in general.
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constructed by combining parts of two or more tranches of a securitization transac-
tion.2 Usually, but not in every case, a CN comprises a share of the first loss piece
(FLP), which is the most junior security of a securitization transaction, also known
as equity piece or junior security. The creation of combination notes is not part
of the original structuring process, which means that “plain vanilla” tranches are
created first given the estimated portfolio loss distribution of the underlying asset
portfolio, and combination notes result from combining parts of two or more of the
“plain vanilla” tranches after their structure was determined. Furthermore, most
CNs carry a rating assigned by one of the dominating rating agencies, and their
existence is observed by market participants.
However, if capital markets were perfect and complete, neither combination notes
nor securitization in general could add value to a firm. But market frictions exist,
which can make securitization and also the creation of combination notes value cre-
ating.3 From an originator’s point of view, securitization in general can serve three
main purposes: raising funds, risk transfer, and arbitrage. Considering combination
notes in particular, several of these motivations might drive their issuance. Combi-
nation notes possibly facilitate equity transfer, which becomes more important due
to the new regulatory framework Basel II.4 But also asset managers that issue man-
aged CDO transactions and that are not necessarily regulated, will prefer to transfer
equity rather to retain it. On the one hand, asset managers’ capital is limited. Sell-
ing a share of the FLP allows them to structure larger transactions respectively to
increase their leverage or to increase their turnover. On the other hand, asset man-
agers generate a substantial part of their income via fees, and therefore will prefer
to transfer equity risk to market participants. From an investor’s perspective, com-
bination notes can facilitate the access to a certain risk-return profile, that might
otherwise not be accessible due to investment restrictions, be them internal or exter-
nal. Combination notes allow to participate in the residual income of securitization
transactions, with the investment usually being rated at least investment grade, and
the risk often being concentrated in the interest stream of the note but not in the
principal amount.
While the above motives drive securitization in the market, their security de-
sign has been addressed in several theoretical contributions focusing on transaction
costs, market incompleteness, and asymmetric information. To begin with, pooling
2According to Standard & Poor’s, 2002, p. 143, CNs can also comprise parts of tranches of different
deals, which however was not observed for any CN in the data used here. A structure that was
observed three out of 398 times was the combination of equity with OATs (obligation assimilable
du tre´sor, a French government bond).
3See Bluhm / Overbeck / Wagner, 2003, pp. 253-263 for a detailed description of originator and
investor benefits of CDOs, Merchant (2004) for an introduction to the investor’s point of view on
CDO equity, and Brennan / Hein / Poon (2008) for an analysis of arbitrage CDOs.
4Under the new regulatory framework (“International Convergence of Capital Management and
Capital Standards - A Revised Framework”), the distorting incentives to sell high quality assets
while retaining low quality assets were mitigated in order to stop regulatory capital arbitrage. See
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004, §§ 538-643, for the treatment of securitization
transactions. As a result, selling the FLP has become more common in recent years, see Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2006, p. 56 and Fitch Ratings, 2005, p. 6. The extent to which equity
pieces have been sold is so far unknown to regulators, greater transparency is discussed by market
participants, see Fitch Ratings (2008).
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of assets can reduce costs, when the trading of individual loans is costly.5 Gaur
et al. (2003) analyze market incompleteness and focus on a market where some
but not all assets can be priced uniquely. They show that singling out new cash
flow profiles increases market spanning, which is rewarded by a premium. Their
results apply to securitization, where the optimal structure arises from the issuer’s
optimization. Problems due to information asymmetries can arise both ex-ante and
ex-post. Ex-ante, the originator can be tempted to choose a poor average asset
quality for the underlying asset pool, which bears the risk of adverse selection and
hence market failure. Articles focusing on ex-ante asymmetries are Boot / Thakor
(1993), Riddiough (1997), DeMarzo (2005), and Plantin (2004). Ex-post, investors
of securitization transactions face moral hazard in case the value of the asset pool is
a function of the originator’s unobservable monitoring activity. Articles focusing on
ex-post asymmetries include Gorton / Pennacchi (1995), Gorton / Souleles (2005),
and Schaber (2008a). One stylized result of most of the above articles is the sug-
gestion to retain the first loss piece in order to either send an appropriate signal
to the market concerning asset pool quality in an adverse selection setting, or to
provide the originator with the required incentives to mitigate moral hazard. The
need to retain the FLP is relaxed in Plantin (2004) and Schaber (2008a). Plantin
(2004) is the first to point out explicitly, that the FLP can be sold to sophisticated
investors in case information production on the FLP is profitable to them—a result
in line with Boot and Thakor (1993) but more specifically tailored to securitization
transactions. Schaber (2008a) uses a repeated game argument to show that, even
though the FLP is not retained, incentives to monitor the FLP can be maintained
for the originator in a moral hazard setting.
Given that combination notes commonly comprise a share of the FLP, this pa-
per is the first to analyze observed equity transfer in asset securitization empirically.
Existing empirical evidence on securitization is still scarce, with Firla-Cuchra /
Jenkinson (2005), Firla-Cuchra (2005), and Franke / Weber (2007) being the most
important contributions for this research.6 Firla-Cuchra / Jenkinson (2005) focus on
the impact of market segmentation and asymmetric information on tranching and
pricing of ABS, while Firla-Cuchra (2005) focuses on launch spreads only. Franke /
Weber (2007) strongly focus on the impact of the underlying assets’ quality on
structural choices of CDO transactions such as the size of the FLP, the number of
tranches, and the choice between true sale and synthetic structures. To my knowl-
edge, combination notes so far have not been subject of closer examination, neither
from academia, nor from market participants. The purpose of this article is to
explore the properties of combination notes empirically in the context of existing
evidence. Combination notes are interesting for various reasons. First, given combi-
nation notes commonly comprise some share of the first loss piece, equity transfer can
be estimated. Second, rating of combination notes requires a closer examination, as
the underlying share of equity is commonly not rated and rating methodologies vary
for combination notes. Third, the tranching decision on combination notes can yield
important insights. It can provide evidence, whether combination notes seem to be
5See Duffie / Gaˆrleanu, 2001, p. 42, for a short discussion on transaction costs.
6For an extended version of Franke / Weber (2007) in English language see Franke / Herrmann /
Weber (2007).
3
strongly demand driven, i.e. are structured to cater segmented markets, or equally
reduce information asymmetries. Fourth, the structuring decision of the overall deal
can reveal, whether combination notes are used as equity transfer vehicle. Fifth,
the analysis of launch spreads can reveal whether the presence of combination notes
has an impact on the pricing of securitization transactions. And sixth, combination
notes are complex securities, and provide a venue for an analysis of the success of
financial innovations.
This paper is unique, as it is the first to analyze combination notes, based on a
manually collected dataset. It is also the first paper to shed some light on equity
piece issuance, as general data on the distribution of equity pieces is not available.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, research questions are formulated.
Section 3 provides a description of the data and general insights on combination
notes. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes with a summary
of major results.
2 Derivation of hypotheses on the structuring and
impact of combination notes
The research questions formulated in this section can be grouped in two major blocks.
One block addresses the question to which extend combination notes are tailored
to investor needs and hence cater segmented markets, or if they equally resolve
information asymmetries. The other block focuses on the risk transfer associated
with combination notes. A minor research question focuses on the success of financial
innovations, with CNs being an example for complex securities issued only in recent
years. Different explorative hypotheses are lined out in the following.
Combination notes are securities that have special risk return properties and
might face markets that are not very deep. The existence of limited demand capacity
can make tranching beneficial as it might reduce price discounts or be even necessary
to market CNs at all. Additionally, limited demand capacity might also place an
upper bound on the transferability of equity of a single deal. This leads to the
following hypotheses:
H1 : The number of combination notes increases with the absolute com-
bination note volume in the deal.
H2 : The relative size of the combination notes in a deal will be negatively
related to the overall size of the deal.
Taken together, H1 and H2 also imply a rather constant size of each single
combination note. Aside, it can be suspected, that combination notes will carry
a rating of at least investment grade, which will be elaborated in section 3. If
combination notes were structured to reduce asymmetric information, combination
notes should be tranched more given information asymmetries are higher, which
leads to hypothesis 3:
H3 : The number of new rating classes added to the original number
of rating classes by structuring combination notes will increase with in-
creasing information asymmetries.
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Rating classes is a term first introduced by Firla-Cuchra / Jenkinson (2005)
and is the number of differently rated tranches in a deal. The difference between the
overall number of tranches of a deal and the number of rating classes is called market
classes, i.e. tranches that do not provide new information in terms of rating to capital
markets and that are primarily structured to be marketable.7 However, as the plain
vanilla tranches are structured first, their tranching should reveal most information
on the underlying loss distribution, and their repackaging in a combination note is
not expected to release additional information on the loss distribution. Therefore,
H3 is expected to be rejected.
Combination notes are a means to transfer equity. It shall hence be analyzed,
whether risk transfer can be identified as a driver for the structuring and issuance of
combination notes. Given combination notes are constructed to transfer equity risk,
combination notes will be especially valuable when the quality of the underlying
assets is comparably low and the FLP hence proportionally large. Furthermore,
the share of equity comprised in combination notes cannot be increased arbitrarily
in order to preserve marketability of the CN and to be able to obtain a rating on
the CN. Selling more equity will therefore require to sell a larger combination note.
Together, this results in hypothesis 4:
H4 : The relative size of the combination notes in a deal will be increasing
with decreasing quality of the underlying assets.
The existence of combination notes is observed by market participants. As the
majority of combination notes contains a fraction of the FLP, market participants
have reasonable evidence to notice equity transfer. From the market participants’
perspective, equity transfer is a positive signal on the deal structure: someone is
directing his funds to the most subordinate tranche of the deal, which protects all
other tranches issued in the deal. This positive signal can have an impact on pricing,
and results in hypothesis 5:
H5 : Launch spreads on the plain vanilla tranches decrease with an in-
crease in observed equity transfer.
Combination notes result from combining two or more non-trivial assets, and
are therefore themselves complex securities. It can be argued that experience and
reputation is necessary to successfully issue financial innovations such as combination
notes, which results in hypothesis 6:
H6 : Combination notes are issued by experienced institutions with a
positive track record on the market.
7To take an example, a transaction with two AAA tranches, one AA+ tranche, two AA tranches, one
BBB tranche and one not rated FLP has four rating classes and three market classes. Market classes
can however differ in other characteristics than rating such as currency and maturity. Throughout
the paper, rating letters according to S&P and Fitch Ratings are used, which could equally be
replaced by those of Moody’s.
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The above hypotheses will be tested in section 4. Given data availability, hypoth-
esis 6 will only be discussed in section 3 and not tested in depth. Methodologically,
the analysis will follow Firla-Cuchra / Jenkinson (2005) and Firla-Cuchra (2005)
where possible in order to produce comparable results in this young field of empiri-
cal research.
3 Data description and combination note proper-
ties
3.1 General descriptive statistics
I use a unique dataset on European transactions, where the core data was compiled
from an internal database at HypoVereinsbank/UniCredit Global Markets, which is
fed by different sources such as Moody’s, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, Bloomberg, and
Reuters. Various variables concerning combination notes were manually collected
using pre-sale and new issue reports by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch.
Overall, 130 deals that comprise 1433 tranches, thereof 406 combination notes, could
be identified. This dataset spans a period from July 2002 until September 2007 and
should cover the majority of combination notes issued in Europe in that period,
however, notes that did not appear in any publication cannot be identified. Out of
these deals, four were identified as outliers and removed from the data.8 The data
reduces to 126 deals, 1385 tranches, thereof 398 combination notes. All deals are
backed by loans or bonds, with the majority (97) being leveraged loan securitizations,
and the remainder being securitizations of ABS, mixed assets, CLOs, high yield
bonds, and SME loans. The overall volume of these deals levels at 56.6 e billion,
thereof 4.9 e billion equity.9 Sponsors of these transactions are banks as well as
asset managers.
Some information could be gathered on the asset managers involved in the deals.
Fitch publishes a CDO asset manager rating (CAM). These ratings were assembled
for the asset managers involved in the data where available, and translated into a
numerical value, ranging from 7 (best) to 1 (worst).10 These values were compared
to all available Fitch CAM ratings, as reported in table 1. Doing so, it is assumed
that all of the asset managers rated by Fitch Ratings are active on the CDO market.
8The outliers were removed for the following reasons. One deal was, due to super senior swaps,
extraordinarily large with a deal volume of 2.9 e billion, which is three times larger than the
second biggest deal in the data. One deal is a CFO, hence a securitization of hedge fund and/or
private equity assets, that differs remarkably in its structure by having a FLP that covers 38% of
the deal volume. Two deals comprise extraordinarily large combination notes that cover 60% and
75% of the deal volume, with the third largest relative CN size being 35%, which however is the
CFO just mentioned to be excluded as well. The fourth largest relative CN size is at 24% only, so
that the exclusion of these outliers seems reasonable.
9In case tranches have been issued in dollars, the dollar amounts have been converted to euros using
the corresponding exchange rate.
10The exact mapping is as follows: CAM1=7, CAM1−=6, CAM2+=5, CAM2=4, CAM2−=3,
CAM3=2 and CAM4=1. Fitch CAM ratings were collected from the Fitch web page in November
2007. The approach taken is rather crude, as ratings collected in November 2007 were used for the
data ranging from 2002 to 2007, CAM rating migrations were therefore not taken into account.
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Table 1: Asset manager ratings. Asset manager ratings are assembled from Fitch CDO asset
manager ratings (CAM) and translated in a numerical value, with seven being the best and one
being the worst score.
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
all Fitch CAM ratings 58 4.483 1.442
in dataset by transaction 37 5.270 1.018
in dataset by asset manager 10 4.700 1.160
It can be seen that asset managers involved in structuring combination notes have an
above average Fitch CAM rating. The effect is strong when averaging the asset man-
ager rating by transaction, and only weak when averaging on an asset manager level
(several asset managers appear more than once in the data). Taken together, these
descriptive statistics indicate the importance of experience in structuring complex
structures such as combination notes and can therefore be interpreted as support
for hypothesis 6, which however can only be seen as a first step in its elaboration.
Rating information on the tranches is largely available in the dataset, the rating
distribution can be found in table 2. Rating information was used in two ways, by
using rating dummies and by generating numeric rating indices. Two indices have
been generated, one without taking refinements into account, the rating index, and
one with refinements, the refined rating index. For the rating index, AAA equals 10,
AA equals 9, etc. For the refined rating index, AAA equals 22, AA+ equals 21, AA
equals 20, etc., the entire mappings can be found in table 10 in the appendix. Ratings
were collected from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. In case more than one
rating was available and ratings differ, the index scores were averaged. However,
split ratings were a minor problem, with 70 split ratings, thereof two split ratings
for CNs and only two split ratings with a difference of two notches (A and AA-),
all others with a difference of one on the refined index.11 Here, a further remark is
necessary: as data is partly collected from pre-sale reports, some split ratings arise
due to differences in preliminary ratings and are therefore not necessarily real split
ratings.
Descriptive statistics on the deal level can be found in table 3. Deals are on
average 450 e million in size, with 7.83 plain vanilla tranches (when combination
notes are not taken into account), thereof 4.85 differently rated tranches (rating
classes), and 2.98 additional market classes. Rating classes and market classes were
derived based on the refined rating index. Not rated tranches were considered being
market classes. The mean of not rated tranches is at 1.04, with only four of the 131
not rated tranches not being equity pieces. Thus, roughly speaking, by counting not
rated tranches as market classes the number of market classes per deal increases by
one.
Additional variables were generated from the basic deal characteristics, such as
11Note that the rating index was derived from the refined rating index. Nine times, the refined scores
lie exactly in between two rating grades (e.g. a score of 21.5 on the refined index). These were
translated to the better rating grade on the rating index. Therefore, the rating index only takes
integer values.
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Table 2: Rating distribution.
Rating index combination notes plain vanilla tranches
5 (B) 3 6
6 (BB) 28 121
7 (BBB) 168 151
8 (A) 71 148
9 (AA) 31 146
10 (AAA) 57 284
not available 40 131
Nb tranches 398 987
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the deal level. ex CN denotes variables that were generated
without taking combination notes into account. Deal volume is in e million. Rating classes and
market classes are defined according to Firla-Cuchra / Jenkinson (2005). Share of deal FLP is
the size of the FLP divided by the overall deal volume. Size CN is the aggregate volume of all
combination notes in a deal in e million. Share of deal CN is size CN divided by the deal volume.
Tranche volume CN is the size of a single combination note in e million. Equity fraction of CN
is the equity share in one CN. Deal equity transferred is the share of deal equity transferred with
one CN. The number of observations N is 126, except for the last three lines, where N is reported
with each variable.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Deal volume (e mio) 448.92 149.46 199.95 1000.00
Nb tranches ex CN 7.83 2.00 2.00 20.00
Nb rating classes ex CN 4.85 0.79 1.00 6.00
Nb market classes ex CN 2.98 1.86 0.00 16.00
Nb tranches not rated ex CN 1.04 0.43 0.00 4.00
Share of deal FLP (%) 0.09 0.03 0.005 0.26
Nb CN 3.16 2.05 1.00 9.00
Size CN (e mio) 26.28 19.55 1.00 94.19
Share of deal CN (%) 0.06 0.05 0.002 0.24
Tranche volume CN (e mio) (N=398) 8.32 6.69 1.00 69.00
Equity fraction of CN (%) (N=56) 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.75
Deal equity transferred (%) (N=56) 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.70
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an average rating score for the combination notes per deal, weighted average rating
factors per deal, and a quarter index. The average combination note rating per
deal is the value weighted average of the combination notes’ rating using the rating
index. However, when at least one CN rating is missing in a deal, the average
CN rating is not calculated, as an average of the remaining CN ratings must not
necessarily be a good proxy for all CN ratings in a deal. All CN ratings per deal and
therefore the average CN rating are available for 98 deals.12 The weighted average
rating factor (WARF) per deal is based on rating factors published by Moody’s
and is used as proxy for the quality of the underlying assets. While the WARF
published by Moody’s relies on the individual loans of the underlying asset pool,
the WARF derived here relies on the ratings of the tranches of each deal, as more
detailed information on the underlying asset pool is not available. The rating factors
provided by Moody’s are derived from idealized default probabilities that depend
on ratings and maturities.13 I use rating factors for 10-year maturities (tabulated in
table 10 in the appendix) and calculate the value weighted average of the tranches’
rating factors for each deal, without taking the combination notes into account.
The not rated first loss positions are treated as if rated CCC, as the lowest rated
tranche in the dataset is rated B. As the relationship of ratings to the rating factors
is non-linear, lower rated securities have a stronger impact on the WARF, which
results in a better differentiation of the WARF compared to using a measure such
as the average rating. In the empirical analysis, the WARF is rescaled by taking
the natural logarithm, which results in lnWARF as proxy for the quality of the
underlying asset pool.14 A higher lnWARF indicates lower asset pool quality. The
quarter index is a variable that captures the time structure of the dataset. It is set
to one for the quarter of the first observation in the data (July 2002), increases by
one each quarter, and ends at 21 for the quarter of the last observation in the data
(September 2007).
3.2 Exploring the properties of combination notes
The number of combination notes issued per deal is 3.16 on average, the (aggregate)
volume issued via combination notes per deal is 26.28 e million on average. A
single combination note has a volume of 8.32 e million on average, combination
notes account for 6% of the deal volume on average. Ratings on CNs differ and can
address a rated balance that can differ from the principal balance, further ratings
can address timely payment of interest and principal, ultimate payment of interest
12To make this more clear, consider a deal having three combination notes of equal size, two of them
being rated AA, the third being not rated. When not considering the non rated CN, the average
CN rating for that deal would be nine, however, the non rated CN could be of BB-quality, the
average CN rating should rather level at eight. Therefore, the average CN rating is only calculated
when a rating is available for all CNs in a deal.
13A tabulation of the idealized default probabilities can for example be found in Moody’s, 2003,
p. 19. Rating factors are derived by dividing the default probabilities by the default probability
of an Aaa rated security of the same maturity. A rating factor of 80 hence indicates that the
probability of default is 80 times higher than the probability of default for an Aaa rated security
with equal maturity.
14Equally, the WARF could be retranslated into a rating using table 10, taking the natural logarithm
however makes better use of the available information.
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and principal, or ultimate payment of principal only.15 Rating information is largely
available on combination notes, as can be seen from table 2. Interestingly, only 31
combination notes are rated below investment grade, the majority of CNs (60%) is
rated either BBB or A. The rating distribution of CNs can be seen as a first indicator
that combination notes are tailored to specific investor needs, as a significant share
of investors is likely to be obliged to hold only investment grade securities, be it due
to internal or external constraints. Given an investor is liable to bank regulation,
CNs will likely have required a risk weight of 100% under Basel I, which might have
implied regulatory capital arbitrage. Under Basel II, the treatment of CNs depends
on the specific structural features of each CN.
For 56 combination notes, that belong to 25 different deals, data on the actual
note composition could be gathered. For theses 56 CNs the average share of equity
comprised in one CN is 26%, and the average fraction of deal-equity transferred
with one CN is 8%. Taking this last number, roughly 25% of each deal’s equity was
transferred, which results in an estimate for the overall equity transfer of 1.24 e
billion for the 126 deals (3.16 CNs per deal × 8% of deal equity per CN × 4.9 e
billion in overall equity).
Interestingly, 12 out of these 56 combination notes did not contain any equity
and three times no equity was transferred via combination notes on the deal level
at all. These three deals all only comprised one CN, two of them with a mix of A
and BBB rated tranches, one with a mix of BBB and BB rated tranches. Especially
the creation of the two CNs composed of shares of A and BBB rated tranches is
puzzling, as not even a non investment grade security is transformed to investment
grade, which is the case for the CN composed of BBB and BB rated tranches, as all of
these 12 combination notes were at least rated investment grade. Most combination
notes (47) were composed by parts of two tranches, five CNs were composed by
parts of three tranches, two CNs by parts of four and equally two by parts of five
tranches.
For all of these 56 combination notes, the rating is available. This rating is com-
pared with a manually generated rating, the CN rating revisited. The CN rating
revisited is the value weighted average of the CN components’ ratings, based on the
refined rating index.16 In figure 1 the CN rating revisited is plotted against the true
combination note rating. It can be seen that the actual rating for most combination
notes is better than the manually calculated rating. Furthermore, none of the points
lies substantially above the main diagonal. The dots are furthermore distinguished
by the type of rating that is shown on the x-axis. Circles represent ratings that are
assigned to the ultimate repayment of principal only, whereas triangles represent
ratings that are assigned to the ultimate payment of principal and a rated coupon.
Consistently, the ratings that include the coupon, are closer to the main diagonal,
hence they are not substantially better than the manually derived CN rating re-
15For the rating agencies’ approaches see Standard & Poor’s (2004), Moody’s Investors Service (2004),
and Fitch Ratings (2007).
16A value of five is assigned to the FLP on the refined index, as the lowest rating in the data is a
single B, which corresponds to eight on the refined rating index, and the FLP is considered being
one entire notch down the rating scale. To take an example, a CN that consists of 30% AA, 30%
BBB, and 40% equity is assigned a CN rating revisited of 0.3×20+0.3×14+0.4×5=12.2.
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Figure 1: Actual rating CN vs CN rating revisited
visited. Overall, this can be seen as another indication that combination notes are
tailored to specific investor needs.
For 52 combination notes, launch spreads are available as well.17 However, these
spreads must be treated carefully: from the data it is not possible to identify whether
investors on these notes have a residual claim in addition to the spreads that appear
in the data. As most of the combination notes comprise some equity, most CNs
should comprise an upside potential even when a spread of a certain level is indicated.
As launch spread on combination notes are too few and not obvious to interpret they
are not used in the further analysis.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical determinants of tranching
The tranching decision was analyzed in depth by Firla-Cuchra / Jenkinson (2005),
denoted C/J henceforth. They analyze three main determinants of tranching: in-
vestor sophistication, market segmentation, and asymmetric information. Their
main lines of thought are recapitulated in the context of this research in the fol-
lowing. C/J hypothesize and confirm, that tranching is increasing in investor so-
phistication. For the data used here, investor sophistication is unlikely to be an
important fact, as the data spans a rather recent period, while C/J use data ranging
from 1987-2003. However, the quarter index is included in the following analysis to
control for possible effects due to sophistication of market participants.
Given that market segmentation exists, there should be more tranching. A higher
level of tranching can attract a larger investor base and reduce negative price effects
on large tranches. However, tranching is costly in two ways: tranching has operative
17Launch spreads are measured in basis points and denote the spread over the corresponding bench-
mark, usually the six-month Euribor for the tranches considered here.
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costs, for example legal costs and fees being due to rating agencies. Second, tranching
can also be costly in terms of post issue liquidity, as small tranches might not be
marketable on secondary markets. C/J use the deal size to proxy for these effects
of market segmentation. Large deals should be tranched more to be marketable on
the primary market, small deals should be tranched less to keep costs down and
to maintain post issue liquidity. This relation is confirmed by C/J and expected
to hold here as well. However, opposed to C/J I believe that the lower degree of
tranching of small deals is rather associated with primary market activities, not post
issue liquidity on secondary markets: in case tranches become too small, marketing
(from the originator’s perspective) and research (from an investor’s perspective) is
not cost efficient. The natural logarithm of the deal size (in units of millions) will
be included in the analysis to control for these effects.18
Concerning information asymmetries, C/J hypothesize, that a higher degree of
asymmetric information should be associated with a larger number of tranches, espe-
cially of differently rated tranches. A higher number of rating classes releases more
information on the underlying pool quality and therefore reduces information asym-
metries. C/J construct an index that proxies the degree of information asymmetries,
by ranking the different types of underlying asset classes according to their variabil-
ity of launch spreads. Franke / Weber (2007) assume, that information asymmetries
are higher for CLO transactions than for CBOs and use a CLO dummy as proxy
variable for information asymmetries. As only very few transactions are classified
as CLOs in the sense of Franke and Weber in this data, I instead use a leverage
loan dummy, which is one in case the underlying assets are leveraged loans. For the
leveraged loan dummy it can be argued similarly to a CLO dummy: information on
leveraged loans underlying a securitization transaction are likely to be more difficult
to obtain than information on publicly traded bonds or on tranches of CLOs and
CDOs, the two other important types of underlying in the dataset. Comparing the
volatility of launch spreads of the leveraged loan transactions to the volatility of
launch spreads of the remainder of the dataset reveals that the volatility is higher
among the leveraged loan securitizations. The volatility of launch spreads is cal-
culated as the mean of the volatilities of launch spreads calculated per full letter
rating grade. Furthermore, the ordering is not sensitive to the choice of a value
weighted or equally weighted mean across the rating grades. Hence, the leveraged
loan dummy is consistent with both the approach chosen by C/J and by Franke /
Weber. Additionally, a level-management dummy is used as alternative proxy for
information problems. The level-management dummy is one in case the deal is fully
managed. For fully managed transactions, information problems tend to be more
pronounced due to hidden action problems.
Several control variables are employed by C/J such as the quality of the un-
derlying asset pool, actual bond market conditions, and WALs on the deal level
(value weighted average of tranche WALs). The impact of the asset pool quality
is ambiguous. While C/J hypothesize a positive relationship for the pool quality
and the number of rating classes, a negative relationship is assumed by Franke /
Weber (2007). Both C/J and Franke / Weber find some but limited support for
18All the natural logarithms on tranche and deal volumes are taken on the values in units of millions,
i.e. for a deal of size 100 e million Ln deal volume equals Ln(100).
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their hypotheses. Schaber (2008b), based on a transactions cost driven hypothesis,
finds support for an increasing number of rating classes given a decrease in asset
pool quality. Concerning the actual bond market conditions, C/J argue that severe
bond market conditions require a more pronounced catering of investor needs and
hence imply a higher number of market classes. C/J find that for a steep yield
curve less rating classes and more market classes are issued. In the following, the
lnWARF will be used to control for deal quality, while bond market conditions are
captured by using the yield of ten year AAA Euroland government bonds provided
by Datastream and the difference between ten year and two year AAA Euroland
government bond yields. As the average WAL is available only for a subset of the
data, it is not used in the following specifications, but results are robust to adding
the average WAL.
Subsequently, three tranching decisions will be analyzed. First, tranching is ana-
lyzed without taking the combination notes into account, which serves as a reference
case to C/J and to the further analysis. Thereafter, tranching within the combi-
nation notes and the tranching of combination notes in the deal context will be
analyzed. The tranching decision within the combination notes of a deal can pro-
vide evidence on market segmentation, the tranching decision of combination notes
in the deal context might shed light on the reduction of information asymmetries.
The tranching decision is analyzed by running ordered logistic regressions. Some
of the analyzed numbers of tranches are unequally distributed at the lower and the
higher end. In that case, numbers of tranches below the 10% and above the 90%
quantiles of the data are grouped together at the 10% respectively 90% quantiles
of the relevant number of tranches. Further, the subsequently presented regressions
do not violate the parallel regression assumption inherent to ordered logistic regres-
sion. As a further robustness test, poisson regressions have been run, with the major
results being unchanged.
4.1.1 The benchmark case - tranching of plain vanilla tranches
The analysis of tranching without taking the combination notes into account should
reveal results similar to C/J. However, models on the overall number of tranches and
the number of market classes are not of statistical significance, which is probably due
to the small sample size (126 deals compared to 1605 in C/J). Therefore, only the
regression of the number of rating classes on all of the explanatory variables lined
out above is reported in table 4. Only the leveraged loan dummy and the slope of
the yield curve turn out statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on
the leveraged loan dummy, given it proxies for information asymmetries, shows the
expected sign. When it is replaced by the fully-managed dummy, the coefficient on
the fully-managed dummy is positive as well, but statistically not significant, while
the coefficient on the lnWARF increases in size and turns statistically significant at
the 1% level (not reported). Thus, the LL dummy could also proxy for a lower asset
pool quality that is not captured in the lnWARF, and is associated with a higher
degree of tranching, see Schaber (2008b). Hence, there is some but limited evidence
that information asymmetries drive the creation of differently rated tranches, as well
as there is some but limited evidence, that the number of differently rated tranches
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Table 4: Tranching of plain vanilla tranches. Dependent variable is the number of rating classes
without taking combination notes into account. Results are reported for ordered logit estimation.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are are reported in parentheses. Significance of coeffi-
cients is indicated by asterisks, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Ln deal volume LL dummy lnWARF Quarter index Yield level Yield slope
0.261 1.721** 0.135 -0.076 0.121 -2.313**
(0.613) (0.671) (0.345) (0.101) (0.459) (0.929)
Sample size: 126 McFadden’s R2: 0.171 Prob > χ2: 0.000
rises with decreasing quality of the underlying asset pool. Consistent with C/J,
the deal volume does not have a strong impact on the number of differently rated
tranches. Further, increasing investor sophistication, proxied by the quarter index,
does not have an impact in this comparable short time period. Again in line with
C/J, the slope of the yield curve has a negative impact on the number of rating
classes. As will be shown below, higher long term interest rates have an increasing
effect on launch spreads, and hence make securitization more expensive. An increase
in the slope of the yield curve hence can prevent the creation of tranches, likely at the
bottom of a securitization structure, as these tranches become increasingly expensive
to issue.
4.1.2 Tranching of combination notes
In this section, tranching within the combination notes is analyzed. For that pur-
pose, the number of rating classes and market classes have been derived when only
considering combination notes of each deal.19 There are several not rated combina-
tion notes. Not rated CNs are considered as market classes, which is consistent with
the approach taken for the plain vanilla tranches. However, counting not rated CNs
as market classes could introduce a bias, as some of the not rated CNs are possibly
rated but the rating is not available in the dataset. Therefore, the number of market
classes was additionally derived without considering the not rated tranches as mar-
ket classes, but results remain unchanged (not reported). In nine deals not a single
CN is rated. These deals are dropped for the further analysis of rating and market
classes, which results in 117 observations. On average, there are 2.39 rating classes
and 0.85 market classes amongst the combination notes per deal, when not rated
tranches are considered as market classes.20 Again, ordered logit is estimated and
regressions are run for the overall number of tranches, the number of rating classes
and the number of market classes. The lnWARF is not considered as explanatory
variable in this setting as a reasonable link between the underlying asset pool quality
19To take an example, a deal that comprises three combination notes, one rated AA and two rated
A, comprises two rating classes and one market class among the combination notes, independent
of the rating and number of plain vanilla tranches in the deal.
20The average number of combination notes in these 117 deals levels at 3.25, hence slightly above
the average number of combination notes in the whole dataset as reported in table 3.
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and the tranching decision within CNs cannot be established.
As stated in hypothesis 1, the number of combination notes is expected to rise
with the absolute volume of combination notes in a deal. This relation should hold
for the number of rating and market classes, but be stronger for the number of
market classes, given there exists a negative relation for the size of a CN and its
marketability. The data strongly supports this hypothesis, as can be seen from
table 5. The coefficients on the aggregate CN volume are highly significant and of
the expected sign for all the different dependent variables, and are larger for market
classes than for rating classes. Predicted probabilities show that for small aggregate
CN volumes the probability for only a single combination note and hence for a
single rating class is very high, while in that case obviously a very high probability
is assigned to zero market classes. Probabilities for higher numbers of rating and
market classes rise with rising aggregate combination note volumes.21
As reported above, the leveraged loan dummy is associated with a higher num-
ber of plain vanilla rating classes. This must not hold for the tranching within
combination notes for two reasons. First, combination notes are a combination
of plain vanilla tranches and should therefore not reveal additional information on
the underlying loss distribution. Second, the rating classes considered here are not
necessarily unique ratings in the deal, as only the tranching within the CNs is con-
sidered. However, the coefficient on the LL dummy is positive and significant for
the overall number of CNs and for the number of rating classes among the CNs. A
possible explanation is that a higher degree of tranching on the level of plain vanilla
tranches is associated with a higher degree of tranching of CNs, which will also be
supported in the next section. Another explanation might be, that the average qual-
ity of the underlying assets in leveraged loan securitization is below the quality of
the remaining transactions in the data, and lower quality assets are only marketable
in smaller tranches. Adding the lnWARF to the model does remove the significance
from the LL dummy for the second model (rating classes), while the coefficient on
the lnWARF is positive and significant on the 10% level (not reported). The other
two models are not substantially altered by adding the lnWARF. Investor sophisti-
cation, proxied by the quarter index, did not help to explain tranching in the section
above. For combination notes, an increasing number of combination notes could be
expected with the quarter index, as the market for combination notes might not have
been as mature in 2002 as the securitization market in general, which however is not
supported by the data. Again, it is controlled for the interest rate environment by
using the slope and the level of the yield curve. Consistent with the results derived
on plain vanilla tranching, the level of long term yields has a negative, statistically
weak, impact on the number of all CNs and the number of rating classes.
21For a more detailed understanding, the following table presents predicted probabilities for the
number of rating classes. Several discrete values of Ln size CN are evaluated, while all other
variables of the model (model 2 in table 5) are held at their mean (the mean of size CN is at
26.28 e million, Ln(26.28) ≈ 3.27):
P (y = 1 | x) P (y = 2 | x) P (y = 3 | x) P (y = 4 | x)
Ln size CN = 1 0.9678 0.7382 0.2093 0.0242
Ln size CN = 2 0.027 0.2089 0.4175 0.1119
Ln size CN = 3 0.0044 0.0438 0.2838 0.3524
Ln size CN = 4 0.0009 0.0091 0.0895 0.5115
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Table 5: Tranching of combination notes. Dependent variables are the number of combination
notes per deal, the number of rating classes within the combination notes, and the number of
market classes within the combination notes where not rated tranches are considered being market
classes. Results are reported for ordered logit estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses next to the coefficients. Significance of coefficients is indicated
by asterisks, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent var. all rating market
Ln size CN 3.468*** (0.433) 2.366*** (0.355) 2.923*** (0.537)
LL dummy 0.815* (0.443) 1.058** (0.475) −0.155 (0.530)
Quarter index 0.068 (0.156) −0.003 (0.219) −0.003 (0.202)
Yield level −1.305* (0.729) −1.545* (0.907) 0.454 (0.675)
Yield slope 0.639 (1.282) −0.236 (1.620) 0.965 (1.446)
Sample size 126 117 117
McFadden’s R2 0.347 0.291 0.361
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall, the aggregated size of the combination notes in a deal strongly deter-
mines their tranching. For univariate regressions of the different dependent variables
on the ln size CN variable, pseudo R2s level at 32.9%, 25.4%, and 33.2%.
4.1.3 Tranching of combination notes versus the deal
In this last subsection on tranching, the tranching of combination notes is analyzed
in the context of the existing deal structure. Again, rating and market classes are
derived. Now, the number of rating classes amongst the combination notes is the
number of newly created ratings when comparing the combination notes to the plain
vanilla tranches of the deal. The remainder of the combination notes is classified as
market classes.22 Using this definition, the average number of rating classes among
the CNs decreases to 1.2, the average number of market classes rises to 2.05. Ordered
logit is estimated for two specifications, which are discussed in the following. In the
first model specification, only the variables that were used when analyzing plain
vanilla tranching are considered as explanatory variables. Using this first model,
the impact of general deal characteristics on the tranching of combination notes
versus the deal is analyzed. Model two controls for CN characteristics. The number
of observations drops to 98 for the second specification as the average combination
note rating is only available for that subset of the data.
For the first specification, the most interesting variable is the LL dummy. By
structuring combination notes, it is possible to add new ratings to an existing secu-
ritization structure, captured as rating classes in this section. This new rating could
possibly add additional information on the underlying asset pool and therefore re-
22To take an example: a deal that comprises one AAA, two AA+, one A, one BBB and one not rated
FLP and additionally three combination notes, two of them rated AA-, one rated A, comprises one
rating class and two market classes amongst the combination notes versus the deal, as one new
rating in generated in the overall deal structure (AA-).
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Table 6: Tranching of combination notes versus the deal. Dependent variables are the number
of combination notes per deal, the number of rating classes of CNs versus the deal, and the num-
ber of market classes of CNs versus the deal. Results are reported for ordered logit estimation.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Sig-
nificance of coefficients is indicated by asterisks, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent var. all rating market all rating market
Ln deal volume 0.809 0.093 1.038 0.077 −0.683 0.840
(0.687) (0.797) (0.643) (1.268) (0.978) (0.861)
LL dummy 0.873** 0.277 1.170** 0.505 0.073 0.867
(0.423) (0.507) (0.557) (0.788) (0.656) (0.795)
lnWARF 0.170 0.610 −0.074 0.487 0.928 −0.787
(0.209) (0.385) (0.283) (1.007) (0.582) (0.904)
quarter running 0.160 0.017 0.097 −0.085 0.012 0.086
(0.121) (0.145) (0.098) (0.173) (0.154) (0.175)
Yield level −1.494*** −1.075* −0.654* −0.355 −0.125 −0.172
(0.455) (0.574) (0.395) (1.118) (0.695) (0.722)
Yield slope 2.025** 0.562 1.715** −0.091 0.253 1.481
(0.922) (1.091) (0.742) (1.558) (1.153) (1.342)
Ln size CN 3.390*** 1.120*** 2.204***
(0.494) (0.368) (0.422)
Nb rating cl. ex CN 0.537** 0.385 0.399
(0.268) (0.249) (0.300)
Average rating CN −0.123 −1.021*** 0.616**
(0.269) (0.294) (0.271)
Sample size 126 117 117 98 98 98
McFadden’s R2 0.056 0.043 0.054 0.354 0.146 0.278
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000
duce information asymmetries, as stated in hypothesis 3. The data does not support
this hypothesis: there is evidence that more CNs overall and more market classes
are issued for LL transactions in specification one, but there is no impact of the LL
dummy on the number of rating classes. The positive effect on the number of market
classes can be explained by endogeneity rather than by economic reasoning: given
that more (plain vanilla) rating classes are created for LL transactions as denoted in
section 4.1.1, there are less (free) rating notches available to be filled by combination
notes. Replacing the LL dummy by the fully-managed dummy (not reported) does
neither indicate that CNs are structured to mitigate agency conflicts. Therefore,
hypothesis 3 must be rejected. The three other additional general deal characteris-
tics, the deal volume, the quarter index, and the lnWARF, do not have an impact
on the tranching decision of CNs versus the deal. When looking at the interest rate
environment, results are mixed, and opposed to the results derived above. However,
pseudo R2s are comparably low for all dependent variables for the first model spec-
ification, and adding the CN specific information in the second model specification
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removes all statistical significance from the coefficients of the first model.
In the second model it is controlled for the aggregate CN volume, the average
rating of the combination notes, and the number of rating classes among the plain
vanilla tranches. The pseudo R2 rises sharply, the three variables have strong ex-
planatory power. The size of the aggregate CN volume again is the dominating
variable. The average combination note rating is endogenous in nature, but still
helpful. As indicated by the coefficients, a high average CN rating implies less rat-
ing and more market classes among the CNs versus the plain vanilla tranches. Given
that the rating distribution for the plain vanilla tranches is skewed towards high rat-
ing grades (more than 50% of all plain vanilla tranches are rated AA- or better, 32%
are rated AAA), it is by definition less likely to generate a new rating class when the
rating assigned to the CN is high. New ratings are more likely to arise for lower rated
combination notes. The number of rating classes among the plain vanilla tranches
is also endogenous in nature: given a high number of rating classes among the plain
vanilla tranches the likelihood for creating a new rating class by a CN should fall.
For the overall number of CNs, a positive relation can be observed with the number
of rating classes among the plain vanilla tranches. Hence, sophisticated structuring
of the deal is associated with the creation of more CNs. Surprisingly, the number
of rating classes of the CNs versus the deal does not decreases with a rising number
of rating classes among the plain vanilla tranches. Apparently the effect of a ris-
ing number of CNs outweighs the endogeneity of a higher number of rating classes
among the plain vanilla tranches (less gaps to fill).
Summarizing the results, combination notes seem not to be structured to solve
information asymmetries, hypothesis 3 can be rejected. Contrary, strong support
is found for hypothesis 1: tranching of combination notes is almost entirely driven
by segmentation effects. This result suggests, that combination notes are only mar-
ketable below a certain size and implies a fairly constant absolute size of combination
notes. As noted above, the average volume of a single CN is at 8.32 e million, with
a standard deviation of only 6.69 e million, a minimum value of 1 e million, a
maximum of 69 e million, and the 95%-percentile at 20 e million. Additionally,
the more sophisticated the original structuring of the deal, the higher the number
of CNs. New rating classes versus the deal arise mainly at low ratings. There is no
evidence that CNs are specifically tailored to fill rating gaps among the plain vanilla
rating classes.
4.2 Combination notes and risk transfer
4.2.1 Measuring equity transfer
It was shown above, that CNs are mainly structured to cater segmented demand,
but not to transmit additional information on the underlying asset pool by their
tranching. From an originator’s perspective, combination notes mainly are a means
to repackage and transfer equity. As noted above, for a subset of the data the
exact composition of combination notes is available, with an average deal equity
transfer of 8% by each single CN. To be able to test hypotheses concerning the equity
transfer via combination notes such as H2, H4, and H5 for the entire dataset, a risk
respectively equity transfer proxy is necessary. Two variables capture the amount of
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equity transfer: the relative size of the aggregate combination note volume per deal,
and the average rating of the combination notes per deal. As lined out in section 3.2
the average equity fraction per single CN is at 26%, with a standard deviation of 19%
for the subset of 56 CNs. Further, the equity fraction of the single CNs is found to
be independent of the size of the relevant CNs. Hence, given a comparably constant
relative equity fraction per combination note, the share of equity transferred on a
deal level will rise with the relative CN volume in a deal. Testing this relation on
the 19 deals where the exact CN composition is known for all CNs, it is strongly
supported: the fraction of deal equity transferred rises in the relative size of the
CNs of the deal.23 Hence, even though there is variation in the equity fraction per
CN, a larger relative CN volume strongly indicates that more equity is transferred
to the market. Therefore, the relative size of the aggregate CN volume per deal can
serve as a measure of equity transfer, and is called share of deal CN. The variation
in the equity fraction per CN could be captured in each CN’s rating, a larger equity
fraction implies a lower rating. This information was captured in a former version
of this paper to derive an equity transfer proxy that equalled the share of deal CN
divided by the average combination note rating of the relevant deal. The proxy
variable showed similar but slightly weaker results than when using the share of
deal CN variable on a stand alone basis. This can be due to a reduction in the
sample size but also to the ambiguity concerning the meaning of combination note
ratings (rating to a rated balance, principal only ratings, etc.). Subsequently, results
are only reported for the share of deal CN variable.
4.2.2 Equity transfer and deal characteristics
Hypotheses 2 and 4 both make a prediction about the relative size of the combination
notes in a deal. H2 states that the relative size of the CNs in a deal will decrease
with the volume of the deal due to a limited market capacity for equity of a single
transaction. H2 can hence provide further support for the idea of segmented markets.
H4 states that, as it is not possible to arbitrarily increase the amount of equity in a
single CN, the relative CN volume will rise for a lower deal quality, assuming that
risk transfer is a transaction motive. Support for this hypothesis would indicate,
that CNs are indeed structured as equity transfer vehicles.
To test these hypotheses, two ordinary least squares regressions are run with
the share of deal CN as dependent variable. The explanatory variables of most
interest are the deal volume (used in logarithmic form) and lnWARF as proxy for
the quality of the underlying assets, which are tested on a stand alone basis in
model I. Several control variables are added in model II. The time structure is
captured by the quarter index. Proceeding in time could have different implications
for the amount of equity transfer: investors might be more familiar with CNs and
be willing to buy larger CNs, or CNs that comprise more equity. Contrarily, as
equity pieces are being sold more often directly in recent years, the issuance of CNs
might become less important to originators. The number of rating classes among the
23An univariate OLS regression of the fraction of deal equity transferred on the relative size of the
CNs results in a highly significant coefficient of about four on the relative size of the CNs, and a
R2 of about 76%.
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Table 7: Equity transfer and deal characteristics. Dependent variable is share of deal CN. OLS
is estimated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses next to the
coefficients. Significance of coefficients is indicated by asterisks, where ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
I II
lnWARF 0.010*** (0.004) 0.008* (0.004)
Ln deal volume −0.025** (0.012) −0.022* (0.012)
Quarter index 0.004* (0.002)
Nb rating cl. ex CN 0.018*** (0.005)
Yield level −0.019* (0.011)
Yield slope 0.060*** (0.017)
Constant 0.149* (0.082) 0.044 (0.094)
Sample size 126 126
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.181
Prob > F 0.001 0.000
plain vanilla tranches should have a positive impact on the equity transfer, because
a higher number of plain vanilla rating classes is associated with a higher number
of CNs. Level and slope of the yield curve again are used to control for market
conditions. Given the pure expectations theory, a steep yield curve is associated
with rising interest rates, and hence less favorable future market conditions from
the originator’s perspective. More generally, a steep yield curve should be related to
an overall favorable macroeconomic environment and might facilitate equity transfer
due to low levels of risk aversion. A steep yield curve should hence be associated with
high selling activities, and therefore also with a higher degree of risk transfer. The
leverage loan dummy is not considered as control variable, as, from a risk transfer
perspective, there should not be a difference on the specific type of underlying.24
Table 7 presents the results which support H2 as well as H4. Concerning H2,
coefficients on the deal volume are of the expected sign and significant at 5% and
10%. Estimates in model I indicate, that an increase of 10% in the deal size roughly
reduces the share of deal CN by about 0.0025 in absolute terms (the mean value for
the share of deal CN is at 0.06). Hence, the market for combination notes of a single
deal and therefore equity seems to be bound from above. Concerning H4, estimates
in model I indicate, that an increase of the lnWARF by one induces an increase of
the share of deal CN of 0.01. An increase of the lnWARF by one would for example
roughly correspond to a move from an on average A-rated asset pool to an on average
BBB-rated asset pool. This positive and statistically significant relation indicates,
that CNs are used as risk transfer vehicle by their originators. The control variables
add additional insights and remove some significance from the deal volume and the
lnWARF. There is weak support that equity transfer increased during the sample
period, which might be linked to rising investor sophistication. Coefficients for the
24The LL dummy turns out not significant when added to the analysis, but removes explanatory
power from the lnWARF variable. This again indicates a lower quality of leveraged loan transac-
tions.
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number of plain vanilla rating classes and the slope of the yield curve are as expected
and highly significant. The number of plain vanilla rating classes and the slope of
the yield curve explain a substantial fraction of the variation: when only using these
two variables as explanatory variables, adjusted R2 levels at 13.6%. Dropping both
the deal volume and lnWARF from model II reduces the adjusted R2 to 15.8%.
Several robustness checks have been performed and are lined out in the following,
but not reported. The lnWARF was replaced by the relative size of the FLP. The
relative size of the FLP equally is a proxy for a lower deal quality, however not
as comprehensive as the lnWARF. Coefficients on the relative size of the FLP are
positive, hence in line with H4, but not statistically significant in most specifications.
Equivalent regressions have been run on the subsample of 19 deals where the true
CN compositions are available, with the volume of equity truly transferred via CNs
as a share of the overall deal volume as dependent variable. Signs of all coefficients
remain unchanged, coefficients in model I loose their significance, significance of
coefficients in model II either remains at the levels reported in table 7 or increases.
Further, given that the share of deal CN variable is a fractional dependent variable,
a generalized linear model following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) was estimated,
using a logit link and the binomial family. Results remain almost unchanged, the
significance of the coefficient on the deal amount increases to the 5% level in model
II. Marginal effects evaluated at the means of the regressors are very close to the
coefficients obtained using OLS. Overall, even though the control variables explain
a substantial fraction of variation in the data, the coefficients on the deal amount
and the lnWARF have the expected sign, are statistically significant, and robust to
alternative model specifications.
4.2.3 Equity transfer and launch spreads
Empirical literature on bond spreads grew strongly in recent years, with several arti-
cles focussing on corporate bonds.25 Studies on the pricing of asset backed securities
are still rare. Boudoukh et al. (1997) examine the pricing of MBS by the level
and slope of the yield curve. Scheicher (2008) examines spread changes on CDS
index tranches of the iTraxx and the CDX. Longstaff and Rajan (2008) decompose
CDX spreads into three major components: idiosyncratic risk, sector default risk,
and systemic risk. The two closest related studies to the analysis presented here are
Firla-Cuchra (2005) and Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005) (C/J). Both focus on
launch spreads of ABS in level form, just as the remainder of this section will do.
Firla-Cuchra (2005) finds that launch spreads are well described by credit ratings
without refinements, but variables associated with liquidity, market segmentation,
distribution efforts, and the prevailing legal regime can explain further variation in
launch spreads. C/J analyze the impact of tranching on pricing of ABS. They find
that a higher number of predicted rating classes reduces launch spreads, while it is
controlled for all common pricing factors.
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the amount of observed equity
transfer proxied via combination note properties has an impact on the pricing of plain
25See for example Duffee (1998), Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Perraudin /
Taylor (2003), Campbell / Taksler (2003), Driessen (2005) and Amato / Remolona (2005).
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vanilla securities, hence hypothesis 5 is tested. Combination notes are observed by
market participants, and could be a positive signal to plain vanilla tranche investors:
some other market participant is directing funds towards a share of the FLP, the
most subordinate security of the deal, that protects other investors. An investment
in that security by a market participant could hence be interpreted as quality signal
for the deal in general, and hence imply lower launch spreads. Again, the share
of deal CN variable is used to measure the equity transfer. Methodologically, the
following analysis is equivalent to C/J and Firla-Cuchra (2005). The majority but
not all explanatory variables used in C/J and Firla-Cuchra (2005) are used in this
study. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of launch spreads, with almost
all launch spreads referring to Euribor. Combination notes, equity pieces, fixed rate
issues, zero bonds, and super senior swaps are excluded from the analysis, which
reduces the data to 766 floating rate notes. The origination spread is available on
718 of these floaters, belonging to 124 deals. Two different approaches are taken
in the following. First, all launch spreads are analyzed in a pooled regression, the
tranche’s rating is captured by rating dummies or the refined rating index. Second,
tranches are organized according to their rating and launch spreads are analyzed
within the different rating categories to derive a better understanding of pricing
factors beyond ratings.
For the first approach, seven models are estimated by OLS, considering three
groups of explanatory variables: credit rating information, interest rate parame-
ters, and deal respectively tranche specific information. Standard errors are het-
eroskedasticity robust, and the estimation of standard errors accounts for the fact,
that tranches are not necessarily independent within a deal, but independent for
different deals. Results are reported in table 8. Model I only uses rating dummies
without refinements, with A being the omitted credit rating. Rating dummies were
derived from the rating index, and are hence based on average ratings in case differ-
ing ratings from more than one agency were available. All coefficients are significant
at 0.1%. Comparing the results to Firla-Cuchra (2005), R2 is significantly higher,
at about 90%, while Firla-Cuchra reports an R2 of 71.9% when only controlling
for rating.26 This strong difference could be due to two reasons: while the data
used here is very homogeneous in types of underlying assets and the time period is
comparably short, data used by Firla-Cuchra spans over 16 years and is based on
various underlyings. However, even when controlling for the time dimension and
types of underlying, but also for deal characteristics and market conditions, R2s
reported by Firla-Cuchra and C/J are clearly below the 90% reached here. The
reason for the high level of R2 observed here might be that even within the category
of collateralized debt obligations, the underlying is very homogeneous in the data
with 97 leveraged loan deals out of 126 deals. Model II adds the share of deal CN
variable. Given H5 holds, the sign on the coefficient should be negative, which is
confirmed by the data, however the coefficient is not statistically significant and the
R2 remains unchanged.
The second set of controls are the level and slope of the yield curve, again mea-
sured by the 10 year yield on AAA Euroland government bonds provided by Datas-
tream and the difference in 10-2 year yields, both used on a weekly basis and in units
26See Firla-Cuchra, 2005, p. 14, model III.
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of percentage points. Using this specification, the two year yield is also fully incor-
porated in the analysis, captured in the slope variable when holding the ten year
yield fixed. Model III adds these two interest rate parameters to model I. R2 rises by
about 5%, coefficients are significant at 0.1%. The interpretation of coefficients needs
to be done carefully. An absolute increase in the two year yield of 10 basis points
(i.e. a decrease of the slope keeping the ten year yield fixed) leads to a reduction of
launch spreads of about 3.8%. This is consistent with empirical findings by Duffee
(1998) and with the contingent claims analysis on corporate bonds by Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995). Contrary, an increase of 10 basis points on the ten year yield is
associated with launch spreads being about 6% higher, considering the coefficients
on the level and the slope holding the two year yield fixed. These results on the long
term yield and the slope differ from existing evidence. The slope of the yield curve
is rather expected to have a negative effect on credit spreads: a steep yield curve is
associated with a sound economic climate, with implies comparably high recovery
rates and thus lower credit spreads. Further, following the expectations theory, a
steep yield curve is associated with rising future short rates, which should result in
lower credit spreads due to the results obtained by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995).27
This negative relation is confirmed by Duffee (1998), as he finds a negative coeffi-
cient for increases in long term yields. Campbell and Taksler (2003) find only limited
support with changing sign for the coefficients on the slope. Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001) find a strong negative relation between long term interest rates and bond
spreads, but only weak statistical significance for the slope coefficient. Scheicher
(2008) finds mixed and comparably weak results concerning the impact of changes
in the level and the slope of the yield curve on changes of index tranche spreads.
Coefficients are only significant for the level of the yield curve and only when it is
controlled for the time period of the subprime crisis, furthermore coefficients differ
for the iTraxx and the CDX. Firla-Cuchra’s results also differ from the results ob-
tained here. Firla-Cuchra uses the ten year yield and 10-2 year swap yields. In that
specification, he finds a negative coefficient on the slope for most model specifica-
tions, indicating a positive impact of higher short term interest on launch spreads.
Looking at the level and slope together, Firla-Cuchra’s results indicate a negative
impact of higher long term interest rates on launch spreads. Coefficients however
are not significant when only focussing on CDOs.28 Results from C/J are similar
to those from Firla-Cuchra (2005).29 Given the differences to my results concerning
the level and the slope of the yield curve and its impact on launch spreads, I tested
the relationship on a comprehensive dataset of CDO origination spreads containing
over 3000 observations, results remain similar to the results presented in tables 8
and 9. Theses differences, especially to the findings by Firla-Cuchra, highlight the
need for further research on the pricing of bundled credit risk on primary markets.
27See Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for these arguments.
28See Firla-Cuchra, 2005, p. 20, table 5, model V.
29Firla-Cuchra additionally controls for interest rate volatility to capture possible effects of the value
of prepayment options on the launch spread. Prepayments are not an issue for the data of European
CDOs used here, the interest rate volatility is thus not considered.
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Table 8: Launch spreads and risk transfer (i). Dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of each tranche’s launch spread. OLS is
estimated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, with the clustering of tranches within deals being taken account of. All
regressions include a constant, which is not reported. Significance of coefficients is indicated as follows: bold coefficients are significant at 0.1%, bold and
italic coefficients are significant at 1%, and coefficients with one asterisk are significant at 5%.
I II III IV V VI VII
Dummy AAA -0.974 -0.974 -0.966 -0.964 -0.795 -0.783
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.039)
Dummy AA -0.453 -0.453 -0.466 -0.466 -0.434 -0.430
(0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Dummy BBB 0.829 0.829 0.827 0.829 0.793 0.792
(0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Dummy BB 1.736 1.736 1.757 1.758 1.710 1.704
(0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
Dummy B 1.925 1.925 2.078 2.092 1.999 1.990
(0.054) (0.054) (0.073) (0.064) (0.055) (0.053)
Refined rating index -0.216
(0.003)
Yield level 0.215 0.191 0.227 0.209 0.201
(0.048) (0.045) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
Yield slope 0.384 0.410 0.350 0.381 0.400
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Share of deal CN -0.013 -1.087 -1.049 -1.041
(0.538) (0.303) (0.321) (0.323)
continued on next page
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Table 8 continued
I II III IV V VI VII
Ln deal volume -0.003 -0.025 -0.029
(0.048) (0.045) (0.045)
Ln tranche volume -0.074 -0.078 -0.054
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Share of deal FLP 0.859 0.919 0.283
(0.788) (0.771) (0.789)
Credit enhancement -0.270* -0.289 -0.015
(0.114) (0.110) (0.098)
Nb rating classes ex CN -0.008 0.014 0.005
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
LL dummy -0.177 -0.168 -0.155
(0.054) (0.052) (0.055)
Sample size 718 718 718 718 718 718 718
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.899 0.952 0.955 0.962 0.964 0.948
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clusters 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
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Reconsidering equity transfer and launch spreads, the share of deal CN variable
is again added to the regression in model IV. The coefficient on the share of deal
CN has the predicted negative sign and is significant at 0.1%. An increase of the
relative aggregate CN volume in a deal by 0.01 implies a decrease of launch spreads
of approximately 1.1%. However the R2 remains almost unchanged.
The last set of control variables are deal and tranche specific information and
are added in model V. It is controlled for the size of the deal a tranche belongs
to and the size of each tranche itself. The deal and tranche size can possibly have
two opposing impacts: while a large deal or tranche might be more difficult to
market and hence more expensive to place in segmented markets, the liquidity of
large deals or tranches on secondary markets will be greater. Firla-Cuchra (2005)
finds a negative coefficient on the overall deal volume but a positive coefficient on
the tranche size, which indicates that on a tranche level there is a negative effect
of demand on price (i.e. higher launch spreads), but that on the deal level the
liquidity effect is dominant.30 Results found here indicate that the liquidity effect is
dominating on the tranche level as well, as all coefficients are highly significant and
of negative sign. Coefficients on the deal size are negative as well, but not significant
in any specification.
Furthermore it is controlled for the share of the FLP on the deal, the level of
credit enhancements, the number of plain vanilla rating classes, and the leveraged
loan dummy. The share of the FLP on the overall deal volume could have a similar
impact as the share of the CNs on the deal volume: a bigger first loss position allows
more defaults to happen until a plain vanilla tranche is hit. However, as the credit
ratings basically arise from the structuring process and hence also from the size of
the FLP, the variable is not expected to have explanatory power, which is confirmed
by the data.
There are various possibilities of credit enhancements in securitization trans-
actions.31 The credit enhancement captured here is the fraction of the deal sub-
ordinated to the relevant tranche of interest. Information captured in the credit
enhancement is hence closely related to the rank in deal of the relevant tranche,
therefore only the credit enhancement is used. The credit enhancement captures
additional information, that is not captured in the credit rating, as even within a
rating category, enhancement levels can differ according to the rank in deal. A nega-
tive coefficient is expected as a higher enhancement level indicates higher protection
in case of defaults in the underlying asset pool. Credit enhancement is significant
on 5% and 1% in models V and VI and of the expected sign.
C/J show that the number of rating classes has a negative impact on launch
spreads. While they predict the number of rating classes from an ordered logit
model on the optimal number of rating classes, the actual number of rating classes
is used here. The findings of C/J are not supported by the dataset used here, which
is also robust to using the predicted number of rating classes (not reported).
Finally, it is controlled for the LL dummy, given the large fraction of leveraged
loans in the dataset. The LL dummy is significant at the 1% level and has a negative
sign. This negative effect on launch spreads could be due to the higher degree
30See Firla-Cuchra, 2005, p. 23, table 6.
31See Hein (2006) for a simulation-based analysis of internal credit enhancements.
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of tranching found for leveraged loan transactions. But as this effect should be
captured in the number of rating classes, the negative coefficient is surprising, even
more so as the LL dummy is also supposed to proxy for information asymmetries.
However, due to missing values on the weighted average life (WAL) of the securities,
it was not controlled for the WAL, even though the WAL should be of importance
when analyzing launch spreads. The analysis was equally performed when using
the subsample where the WAL is available (not reported), the sample size reduces
to 610 tranches. The WAL is significant for some specifications with a negative
coefficient, and removes explanatory power from the LL dummy in models V-VII.
The remaining results are almost unchanged.
Again, the share of deal CN variable is added to the set of explanatory variables
in model VI and is significant at 1%, while coefficients on all other variables and the
R2 are not largely affected.
In model VII, the rating dummies are dropped and instead the refined rating
index is used, capturing more information than the full letter grade rating dum-
mies but on a linear scale. This inclusion of rating refinements removes the size of
the coefficient on the credit enhancement and its significance, while there are no
substantial changes on the other coefficients.
Summarizing the findings up to this point, four observations can be made. First,
rating without refinements explains almost all variation in launch spreads. Second,
the level and slope of the yield curve further help to explain launch spreads. However,
the effects of the interest rate environment are not fully in line with existing literature
and merit further investigation. Third, the equity transfer proxy has the expected
sign, and is statistically significant in three out of four specifications. However, the
maximum increase in adjusted R2 by adding the equity transfer proxy is only in the
dimension of three-tenth of a percent. And fourth, results on the control variables
are in line with expectations.
To better disentangle the effect of observed equity transfer via combination notes
on launch spreads, data is rearranged by the rating categories AAA to BB (only six
tranches are rated single B), and the regressions are run again within each rating
group. Results are reported in table 9. All explanatory variables are considered
again, however the beforehand dominating rating information is eliminated by this
grouping of data.
Several observations are of interest: the coefficient on the tranche volume is only
strongly present for AAA-rated securities. This indicates, that on a tranche level
post issue liquidity matters for senior securities only, while markets for lower rated
securities seem to be segmented and the placement of large tranches not beneficial
from an issuer perspective. Additionally, the deal volume has a negative impact
on lower rated tranches, significant for A rated securities. Hence, there is some
evidence, that for not AAA rated tranches, the marketability is increasing with the
overall deal volume. Further, the credit enhancement is equally only an important
determinant of launch spreads for AAA rated securities. This result is puzzling,
as the credit enhancement should capture additional information versus the credit
rating. Inspecting the data reveals, that variation within the credit enhancement
is only substantial for AAA rated securities, and credit enhancement levels become
more and more similar when moving down the rating grades. Hence, while for senior
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Table 9: Launch spreads and risk transfer (ii). Dependent variable in all regressions is the
natural logarithm of each tranche’s launch spread, grouped by rating category according to the
column headings. OLS is estimated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses, with the clustering of tranches within deals being taken account of. All regressions
include a constant, which is not reported. Significance of coefficients is indicated as follows: bold
coefficients are significant at 0.1%, bold and italic coefficients are significant at 1%, and coefficients
with one asterisk are significant at 5%.
AAA AA A BBB BB
Share of deal CN -0.736* -1.235 -1.472 -1.175* -0.661
(0.301) (0.452) (0.523) (0.477) (0.232)
Yield level 0.215 0.300 0.275 0.147 0.033
(0.041) (0.053) (0.060) (0.049) (0.031)
Yield slope 0.348 0.402 0.467 0.294 0.406
(0.035) (0.057) (0.046) (0.044) (0.028)
Ln deal volume 0.071 -0.060 -0.246 -0.096 -0.063
(0.048) (0.083) (0.066) (0.053) (0.053)
Ln tranche volume -0.113 -0.017 0.023 -0.016 -0.057*
(0.012) (0.039) (0.042) (0.022) (0.027)
Share of deal FLP 0.957 1.542 1.327 2.290 0.254
(0.556) (1.556) (1.094) (1.164) (1.383)
Credit enhancement -0.380 0.195 -0.980 -1.648 -0.646
(0.093) (0.222) (0.591) (0.941) (1.133)
Nb rating classes ex CN 0.014 -0.026 0.038 0.011 0.000
(0.026) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.024)
LL dummy -0.147 -0.304 -0.175* -0.075 -0.087
(0.042) (0.095) (0.072) (0.058) (0.046)
Sample size 234 128 120 127 104
Adjusted R2 0.662 0.711 0.690 0.523 0.801
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clusters 123 119 116 120 102
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securities the level of subordination is determined not exclusively by the rating,
rating alone seems to capture subordination for lower rated tranches. The negative
impact of the LL dummy on launch spreads is confirmed for AAA, AA, and A-rated
securities.
When looking at the equity transfer proxy, results previously obtained in table 8
are confirmed. Coefficients are all negative and significant at 1% and 5%. Adding the
WAL to the explanatory variables removes statistical significance from the coefficient
on the share of deal CN for AAA rated securities, and increases the significance
of the coefficient for BBB rated securities to the 1% level (not reported). The
interpretation is as follows: the further subordinated a security, the higher the risk
of being hit by defaults in the underlying asset pool. The positive quality signal
hence gains importance for lower rated securities, while the effect on senior securities
is limited. Economically, an increase of the relative aggregate CN volume by 0.01
implies a decrease of launch spreads in the range of 0.66-1.47%, as indicated by
the coefficients in table 9 and in line with the results from table 8. However, the
size of the coefficients is not steadily increasing with decreasing rating. Opposed
to the analysis above, adding the share of deal CN variable to the analysis now
increases adjusted R2 noticeable. All regression were equally run without the equity
transfer proxies (not reported). Adding the share of deal CN to the analysis increases
adjusted R2 going from AAA to BB by 0.9%, 1.6%, 2.4%, 3.1%, and 0.9%.
Overall, results indicate that the degree of equity transfer via the issuance of
combination notes is observed by market participants and has a positive impact on
pricing from the issuer’s perspective as launch spreads decrease with rising equity
transfer. However, credit ratings explain the large majority of variation in launch
spreads, the observed equity transfer only has a minor impact.
5 Conclusion
This is the first empirical paper to focus on combination notes issued in securitization
transactions. Several results are derived. Considering the descriptive statistics, the
amount of overall equity transfer was estimated based on a subsample of the data
where the exact combination note compositions are available: on average, about
three combination notes are issued per deal, each containing a fraction of 8% deal
equity. Together, this implies an equity transfer of 1.24 e billion of overall 4.9
e billion equity via combination notes for the 126 deals considered here. Also
for the subsample, the rating of the combination notes is reconsidered: ratings
assigned by the rating agencies are better than the value weighted averages of the
single components’ ratings. However, some of the assigned ratings are principal only
ratings, and some ratings are assigned to a so-called rated balance only.
Tranching of combination notes is entirely driven by segmented demand for these
securities. When focusing on the tranching decision within the combination notes of
a deal, the aggregate volume of the combination notes in that deal is the predominant
explanatory variable. When analyzing the tranching decision of combination notes
on the deal level, no evidence can be found that tranching of combination notes
reduces information asymmetries. Results on the benchmark case, the tranching
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decision among the plain vanilla tranches, are overall in line with existing literature,
however weak in the statistical evidence due to the comparably small sample size.
Furthermore, there is support that the market for combination notes of a single deal
and therefore also equity of a single deal is limited in size, indicated by a negative
relation of the overall deal volume and the relative size of combination notes per
deal.
Further, equity transfer can be identified as driver for the issuance of combi-
nation notes, as the relative size of the combination notes in a deal increases the
lower the quality of the deal. Moreover, equity transfer via combination notes is
observed and accounted for by market participants: an impact of equity transfer
proxied by combination note properties on launch spreads of plain vanilla tranches
is detected. However, the predominant pricing factor for the securities considered
here is the credit rating without refinements. The equity transfer information can
explain variations in launch spreads when securities are grouped according to their
rating, such that pricing factors beyond the credit rating are captured. This refined
analysis reveals that observed equity transfer reduces launch spreads especially for
securities not rated AAA, while the post issue liquidity effect associated with a larger
tranche size and the credit enhancement only have an impact on the launch spreads
of AAA rated securities. Further, there is some but weak support that the overall
deal volume reduces launch spreads for mezzanine securities.
Besides the results described above, several aspects still deserve closer examina-
tion. On a descriptive level, a link between issuer sophistication and the issuance
of combination notes was established. The analysis of this relation could be ex-
tended and generalized by integrating proxies for issuer reputation in the analysis
of launch spreads. Also, results on the interest rate environment and its impact
on launch spreads are mixed when compared to the literature on changes in bond
spreads. Differences are possibly due to the specific characteristics of the underlying
assets analyzed here, but merit closer examination. More generally, a comprehensive
dataset on the issuance or retention of equity pieces in securitization transactions
would allow several interesting research projects. However, the equity piece distri-
bution is unknown even to regulators, and market participants are so far reluctant
to release this confidential information.
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Appendix
Table 10: Rating indices and rating agencies’ letter grades.
Refined rating Rating index S&P / Fitch Moody’s Rating factor
index 10 years maturity
22 10 AAA Aaa 1
21 9 AA+ Aa1 10
20 9 AA Aa2 20
19 9 AA- Aa3 40
18 8 A+ A1 70
17 8 A A2 120
16 8 A- A3 180
15 7 BBB+ Baa1 260
14 7 BBB Baa2 360
13 7 BBB- Baa3 610
12 6 BB+ Ba1 940
11 6 BB Ba2 1350
10 6 BB- Ba3 1766
9 5 B+ B1 2220
8 5 B B2 2720
7 5 B- B3 3490
6 4 CCC+ Caa1 4770
5 4 CCC Caa2 6500
4 4 CCC- Caa3 8070
3 3 CC Ca
2 2 C C
1 1 D default
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